Person
L. A. Paul
Cited in one post, AI Alignment with Changing and Influenceable…, since September 2026
In their words
“Building on Bykvist and Ullmann-Margalit , Paul (2014) and Callard (2018) argue that there is no rational basis for making decisions that change the self.”
· AI Alignment with Changing and Influenceable Reward Functions · machine-resolved
In the claim ledger
4 promoted claims about them. Assessments are the model’s knowledge, not verification.
There may be no uniquely correct notion of trajectory-level optimality for a person with changing preferences.
plausible · AI Alignment with Changing and Influenceable Reward Functions
The paper reports the philosophical position that self-changing decisions have no rational grounding.
consistent · AI Alignment with Changing and Influenceable Reward Functions
The paper endorses Pettigrew's weighted-average-of-selves theory as progress, against Paul's dissent.
unverifiable · AI Alignment with Changing and Influenceable Reward Functions
The paper reports Paul and Sunstein's post-hoc criterion for a legitimate nudge.
unverifiable · AI Alignment with Changing and Influenceable Reward Functions